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BURNING A HOLE IN THE POCKET OF
JUSTICE: PROP. 66’S UNDERFUNDED
ATTEMPT TO FIX CALIFORNIA’S DEATH
PENALTY
Flavia Costea*
California has struggled with the administrative and financial
burdens of a flawed death penalty system for decades. In an effort to save
the death penalty, the voters of California enacted Proposition 66, which
promised to deliver a quicker and more cost-effective system. This Article
focuses on the provision of Prop. 66 that expands the number of lawyers
who can act as defense lawyers for inmates on death row. While this
provision superficially seems to solve the shortage of defense attorneys
willing to take on death penalty cases, without significant funding, the
shortage of resources and pressure to speed up executions may lead to
significant constitutional violations. This Article proposes solutions that
emphasize a cost-benefit analysis and considers public policy concerns
for the future of the death penalty in California.

* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thank you to the editors
and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their help in editing this Article. Thank you,
also, to Professor Sam Pillsbury for his guidance and support.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The death penalty in California is fundamentally broken. The
California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice has
estimated that a death sentence in California costs almost twelve times
more than a sentence of life without parole.1 Keeping an inmate on
death row rather than placing the inmate in a maximum security prison
for life without parole costs an additional $90,000 per year.2 For the
current 740 inmates on death row in California,3 this adds up to an
additional $63.3 million annually.4 Despite the death penalty’s
significant administrative and financial burdens, California has only
executed thirteen inmates since 1978.5 This means that, on average,
California spends $190 million every three years to complete one
execution.6
Six years ago, in a careful cost study, the late Judge Alarcón of
the Ninth Circuit revealed the financial burden that the death penalty
has imposed on the state and implored California to “mend or end” its
death penalty system.7 Instead, voters enacted Proposition 66 (“Prop.
66”) in November 2016.8 Deemed the “Death Penalty Reform and
Savings Act,” voters were lured in by what seemed like an attractive
solution to a deeply flawed system. Prop. 66 sounds great on paper: it
promises fewer appeals, more money donated to victims’ families,
streamlined court processes, a mandatory five-year timeframe, and a
mechanism to force more lawyers to take on death penalty cases and
eliminate the backlog on death row.9 Voters’ support for Prop. 66 is
1. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 147 (Gerald Uelmen &
Chris Boscia eds., 2008), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://
www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1000&context=ncippubs.
2. Id. at 146.
3. Death-Row Prisoners by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (2018),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year.
4. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 146.
5. Evan Wagstaff, Here Are the 13 Men Executed by California Since 1978, L.A. TIMES
(July 16, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://graphics.latimes.com/towergraphic-see-13-men-executedcalifornia-1978.
6. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 141.
7. See Judge Arthur L. Alarcón & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A
Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty
Debacle, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. S41, S42 (2011).
8. California Proposition 66, Death Penalty Procedures (2016), BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_66,_Death_Penalty_Procedures_(2016) (last visited
Oct. 13, 2018).
9. Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016).
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understandable. The public was tired and frustrated with incurring the
costs of a death penalty system, without any of the proffered benefits
of one. The unfortunate reality, however, is that Prop. 66 does not
“mend” the death penalty system. It ignores many practical realities of
the judicial system. These unheeded problems will either make Prop.
66 completely ineffectual in speeding up the death penalty or, succeed,
while compromising accuracy and constitutionality within the
California death penalty system.
The provision of Prop. 66 that seeks to expand the number of
lawyers working on death penalty cases is particularly misguided and
will likely have little effect on speeding up executions. If the
California courts and the legislature succumb to the pressure of trying
to make Prop. 66 effective without more resources, they will likely be
forced to lower the standards for death penalty defense counsel. That
may cause Prop. 66 to actually prolong appeals, due to a potential of a
flood of Sixth and Eighth Amendment challenges.
Part II of this Article will first trace the history of California’s
voter initiative process, how Prop. 66 materialized, and the history of
the death penalty in both the United States Supreme Court and
California. Then, Part III will argue that Prop. 66 will likely be
ineffectual and will force the California judiciary to lower the
qualifications for death penalty defense counsel, which will cause an
influx of constitutional appeals. Finally, Part IV will propose
solutions, and Part V will discuss justifications for those proposals and
important public policy concerns that should be considered.
II. CALIFORNIA’S TROUBLED HISTORY WITH THE DEATH PENALTY
Despite its problems, Prop. 66 passed through the ballot due to
California’s unique voter initiative process. It was written in an
attempt to “save” the death penalty through a series of reforms, rather
than repealing the punishment completely.10 The dysfunctional state
of California’s death penalty system is the result of a long history of
uncertainty concerning the death penalty in the United States Supreme
Court combined with the conflicting California state judiciary and
legislature. Since the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court has
10. John J. Donohue III, Q&A with John Donohue About Prop 66, STAN. L. SCH. LEGAL
AGGREGATE BLOG (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://law.stanford.edu/2017/09/01/qa-with-john-donohue-about-Prop-66/.
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debated the constitutionality of the death penalty, often under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and California has mirrored it.11
A. A History of Prop. 66 and California’s Unique
Voter Initiative System
California is unique in that its voter initiative system allows for
one of the most direct forms of democracy in the United States.12
While this method may seem beneficial in many respects, there is an
inherent danger that the civilian groups who write these ballot
measures do not always have the necessary specialized knowledge of
elected legislators. In many ways, Prop. 66 reflects the flaws of
California’s voter initiative process and lacks an accurate appreciation
of how the judicial system in California functions.
1. Voter Initiatives in California
The voter initiative process has a deep-rooted history in
California. It was adopted in 1911 during a time when the California
legislature was heavily influenced by railroad monopolies.13 Citizens
and other business owners were crippled by legislation that largely
ignored the will of the voters and focused on benefitting the monopoly
of railroads.14
In response to this government abuse, Hiram Johnson, the
governor of California at the time, enacted the voter initiative program
so that citizens could be heard again.15 A voter initiative obviates the
need for approval from the governor or legislature and instead is a
proposition submitted directly to the voters.16 To make it onto the
ballot, an initiative must start as a petition that is submitted to the
11. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972); People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d
880, 883 (Cal. 1972).
12. Hillel Aron, How California’s Ballot Measure Process Got So Kooky, LA WEEKLY
(Oct. 22, 2016, 7:47 AM), http://www.laweekly.com/news/how-californias-ballot-measureprocess-got-so-kooky-7526677.
13. J. FRED SILVA, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS:
BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVE 1 (2000),
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/op/OP_1100FSOP.pdf.
14. See id.
15. John Myers, As Major Reform of California’s Initiative Process Nears Its Anniversary,
the Record Is Mixed, L.A. TIMES (Jun. 24, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/lapol-ca-road-map-initiative-overhaul-record-20180624-story.html.
16. Ballot Initiatives, STATE OF CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: XAVIER BECERRA, ATTORNEY GEN.,
https://oag.ca.gov/initiatives (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
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California Attorney General.17 The petition must then gain a minimum
number of signatures, equal to 8% of registered voters if the
proposition seeks to alter the California Constitution, or 5% if it seeks
to alter a statute.18 Currently, the minimum number of signatures is
585,407 or 365,880.19 Once the signatures are acquired, the legislature
does not have the ability to alter the text of the initiative.20 Once on
the ballot, the proposition must gain more than 50% of the vote to
pass.21
During the era when the voter initiative was created, it saved the
California citizens from oppressive monopoly control.22 The problem,
however, is that the voter initiative system has stayed largely the same
since that time, while political complexities have increased and the
need for stemming monopolistic control by direct initiative has
decreased. What we have today is a system that does not require a
sufficient amount of deliberation before an initiative is on the ballot.
Unlike legislation, which goes through a robust vetting process, ballot
initiatives can change the legal and political landscape in California
before enough thought has been put into the propositions. The result
is often an ill-advised proposition that has not properly weighed the
ramifications and practical consequences of its enactment.
2. Tracing Prop. 66’s Origins
Prop. 66 was written in part by the pro-death penalty
organization, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation.23 It was on the ballot
in November 2016 alongside Proposition 62, which proposed to repeal
the death penalty in California completely.24 Prop. 66 passed with a

17. Id.
18. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8(b).
19. How to Qualify an Initiative, ALEX PADILLA, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE,
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-measures/how-qualify-initiative/
(last
visited
Oct. 10, 2018).
20. Aron, supra note 12.
21. SILVA, supra note 13, at 1–2.
22. History
of
Initiative
and
Referendum
in
California,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/History_of_Initiative_and_Referendum_in_California
(last
visited
Oct. 10, 2018).
23. Maura Dolan, Executions Could Resume After California Supreme Court Leaves Most of
Proposition
66
Intact,
L.A.
TIMES
(Aug. 24, 2017,
3:25
PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-death-penalty-decision-prop-66-20170824story.html.
24. Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016).
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51.3% majority, while hopes of putting an end to capital punishment
with Proposition 62 faded into the distance with 46.1% of the vote.25
Prop. 66 is dubbed the “Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act
of 2016” and, in its essence, puts in a fast-track to lethal injections and
“streamlines” death penalty procedures.26 It amends the California
Penal Code and Government Code to change appeal procedures,
assign the superior courts sole jurisdiction over capital appeal
petitions, establish a five-year time limit for review, allow death row
inmate transfers among California prisons, increase the amount of
inmate wages that are paid in restitution to the victims’ families, and
exempt prison officials from regulations for developing execution
methods.27 Most importantly for the purposes of this Article, Prop. 66
also requires attorneys on the California Court-Appointed Counsel list
to take on death penalty cases if they wish to remain on the
appointment list.28 Specifically, Prop. 66 adds the following text to
California Penal Code section 1239.1:
When necessary to remove a substantial backlog in
appointment of counsel for capital cases, the Supreme Court
shall require attorneys who are qualified for appointment to
the most serious non-capital appeals and who meet the
qualifications for capital appeals to accept appointment in
capital cases as a condition for remaining on the court’s
appointment list. A “substantial backlog” exists for this
purpose when the time from entry of judgment in the trial
court to appointment of counsel for appeal exceeds 6 months
over a period of 12 consecutive months.29
Recently, in Briggs v. Brown,30 the California Supreme Court
upheld the majority of Prop. 66, aside from holding that its five-year

25. Jazmine Ulloa & Julie Westfall, California Voters Approve an Effort to Speed up the Death
Penalty with Prop. 66, L.A. TIMES: ESSENTIAL POLITICS (Nov. 22, 2016, 7:00 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-proposition-66death-penalty-passes-1479869920-htmlstory.html.
26. San Diego Union-Trib. Editorial Board, Why California Should End, Not Streamline, the
Death Penalty, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE (Oct. 23, 2016, 6:00 AM),
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/endorsements/sd-yes-on-prop-62-no-on-prop-66story.html.
27. See Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016).
28. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239.1(b); Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016).
29. Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016).
30. 400 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2017).
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time limit was “directive” instead of mandatory.31 Although the Briggs
opinion did not address the attorney appointment section of Prop. 66
in detail, the language continuously hints at the court’s lack of
optimism as to whether the proposition will effectively fulfill its goal
of speeding up executions.32
The California Rules of Court provide a list of requirements for
death penalty attorneys in order to “promote adequate representation
in death penalty cases.”33 To be lead counsel, these include ten years
of criminal law litigation experience, and experience as lead counsel
in:
(A) At least 10 serious or violent felony jury trials,
including at least 2 murder cases, tried to argument, verdict,
or final judgment; or
(B) At least 5 serious or violent felony jury trials, including
at least 3 murder cases, tried to argument, verdict, or final
judgment;
(4) Be familiar with the practices and procedures of the
California criminal courts;
(5) Be familiar with and experienced in the use of expert
witnesses and evidence, including psychiatric and forensic
evidence;
(6) Have completed within two years before appointment at
least 15 hours of capital case defense training approved for
Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit by the State
Bar of California; and
(7) Have demonstrated the necessary proficiency, diligence,
and quality of representation appropriate to capital cases.34
These stringent qualifications contrast with the rule for appointed
counsel in non-capital appeals. The qualifications of appointed
counsel here are largely up to the courts of appeal’s indigent defense
projects.35 The court rules simply state:

31. Id. at 34.
32. Id. at 61.
33. CAL. R. CT. 4.117.
34. Id.
35. See Court-Appointed Counsel Program, CAL. CTS: THE JUD. BRANCH OF CAL.,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/4201.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2018).
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In matching counsel with the demands of the case, the Court
of Appeal should consider: (1) The length of the sentence;
(2) The complexity or novelty of the issues; (3) The length
of the trial and of the reporter’s transcript; and (4) Any
questions concerning the competence of trial counsel.36
There are six appellate projects in California, one of which is devoted
solely to capital appointments, and the rest of which are devoted to
noncapital appointments.37 Under the authority of the California
Courts of Appeal and California Rules of Court, rule 8.300, the
projects maintain various lists of attorneys qualified for appointment
to cases depending on a case’s difficulty. The criteria or procedures
for the separation of these lists is not available to the public and, from
the broad language of Rule 8.300, it seems that the rules are largely up
to the discretion of the appellate projects rather than a statutory,
publicly available standard.
B. The Evolution of the Death Penalty in the United States
Supreme Court and Its Effect on California
The death penalty has a long and tumultuous history in America
and California. Death penalty statutes have existed in California since
it joined the Union in 1850.38 Between 1893 and 1967 a total of 502
felons were executed, averaging almost seven executions a year.39 The
executions immediately ceased, however, during the United States
Supreme Court’s “de facto moratorium” on capital punishment
between 1967–1977.40 During this time the Supreme Court debated
the constitutionality of the death penalty, and several seminal capital
punishment cases emerged.
1. The United States Supreme Court’s Emerging
Jurisprudence on the Death Penalty
Modern United States Supreme Court jurisprudence can be
summarized into three main categories: the period prior to Furman,
36. CAL. R. CT. 8.300.
37. Appellate
Projects,
CAL.
CTS:
THE
JUD.
BRANCH
OF
CAL.,
http://www.courts.ca.gov/13714.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2018).
38. John H. Culver & Chantel Boyens, Political Cycles of Life and Death: Capital Punishment
as Public Policy in California, 65 ALB. L. REV. 991, 995 (2002).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 991–92.
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when juries were given complete discretion to decide when a death
sentence should be imposed, the Furman period, when the Supreme
Court stopped all executions, and the Gregg period when executions
were allowed to begin again.
a. The pre-Furman Era
Only one year prior to the national death penalty standstill caused
by Furman, the United States Supreme Court decided McGautha v.
California.41 In McGautha, two petitioners, one from California and
one from Ohio, appealed their death sentences and argued that, among
other issues, the death penalty was unconstitutional because juries
lacked any governing standards of when to impose a death sentence.42
In McGautha’s trial, the jury instructions stated that, “in determining
which punishment shall be inflicted, you are entirely free to act
according to your own judgment, conscience, and absolute
discretion.”43 Petitioners argued that such a “fundamentally lawless”
method of imposing the death penalty violated their right to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment.44
The Court, however, was not persuaded by their argument. Justice
Harlan, in his majority opinion, cited various sources of history and a
wide swath of cases, which asserted that, in order for the death penalty
to work, its imposition should remain solely up to the discretion of the
jury and death eligible crimes could not be confined to finite
categories.45 Justice Harlan further reasoned that the “infinite variety
of cases and facets to each case would make general standards either
meaningless ‘boiler-plate’ or a statement of the obvious that no jury
would need.”46 Thus, the Court rejected the notion that a lack of
governing standards for death penalty sentences violated anything in
the Constitution.47

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

402 U.S. 183 (1971), reh’g granted, vacated by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
Id. at 196.
Id. at 189–90.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 183–197.
Id. at 208.
Id. at 207.
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b. The Furman Era
The sentiment in McGautha dissipated quickly, as the very next
year the United States Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia48
and overturned McGautha.49 In Furman, the Supreme Court held that
the death penalty violated the “cruel and unusual punishment” clause
of the Eighth Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because of the largely arbitrary and discriminatory
fashion with which it was being carried out within the states.50 The
case concerned three black men sentenced to death, one on the basis
of felony murder and the other two on the basis of rape.51 As part of
the unusual per curiam opinion in which each Justice wrote a separate
concurrence, Justice Stewart wrote,
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all
the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968,
many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among
a capriciously selected random handful upon whom the
sentence of death has in fact been imposed.52
The case struck down death penalty schemes in all states until the
schemes could be amended to alleviate the arbitrary nature with which
they were being applied. During this time, states worked towards
revising their death penalty statutes in an effort to make them fairer
and more even-handed in application.
c. The Gregg Era
Gregg v. Georgia53 then gave new life to the penalty. The
Supreme Court affirmed petitioner Troy Gregg’s death sentence for
the murder and armed robbery of two men who had picked up Gregg
and his companion, Floyd Allen, as hitchhikers.54 Gregg was found
guilty and sentenced to death under Georgia’s revised death penalty
statutes.55 The jury was instructed that in order to give a death
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
Id. at 239–40.
Id. at 239–40 (1972).
Id. at 252–53 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id. at 207.
Id. at 161.
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sentence, one of the following three aggravating factors must be
found:
One[:] That the offense of murder was committed while the
offender was engaged in the commission of two other capital
felonies, to-wit the armed robbery of [Simmons and Moore].
Two[:] That the offender committed the offense of murder
for the purpose of receiving money and the automobile
described in the indictment.
Three[:] The offense of murder was outrageously and
wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman, in that they [sic]
involved the depravity of [the] mind of the defendant.56
The jury found that the first two aggravating factors had been met.57
The Supreme Court then held that Georgia’s revised death penalty
statutes eliminated the arbitrariness that worried the Court in Furman,
with the addition of its “aggravating factors” that were now required
in order to impose a death sentence.58 It was believed that by requiring
a seemingly objective set of circumstances to impose the death
penalty, juries would necessarily be more consistent in their
sentencing.59 After Gregg was handed down, as long as a state adopted
their own list of aggravating factors that were similar to Georgia’s,
they were permitted to start executions again.
2. California’s Own Difficulties with the Death Penalty
California was substantially affected by this uncertain period for
the death penalty in the United States Supreme Court, and similarly
went through several cycles of deciding if and how the death penalty
should be carried out. On February 18, 1972, in People v. Anderson,60
the California Supreme Court ruled that the death penalty violated
Article 1, Section 6 of the California Constitution, which forbids
“cruel or unusual punishment,” and stated that capital punishment in

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 161.
Id.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 206–07.
493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972).
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California “offend[ed] contemporary standards of decency.”61 The
California Supreme Court seemed to have missed the mark on their
estimation of “contemporary standards,” however, as voters quickly
reenacted the death penalty just later that year by passing ballot
measure Proposition 17.62
Proposition 17 (“Prop. 17”) amended the California Constitution
by adding Section 27 to Article 1, which put into force all death
penalty statutes and stated:
The death penalty provided for under those statutes shall not
be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or
unusual punishments within the meaning of Article I,
Section 6 nor shall such punishment for such offenses be
deemed to contravene any other provision of this
constitution.63
In the wake of Prop. 17, the state legislature had to figure out a
practical way to implement a new statutory scheme that was also
within the confines of Furman and Gregg.64 The legislature in
California did this by adopting a series of aggravating factors into the
death penalty statutes, similar to the ones Georgia adopted in Gregg,
as to eliminate the potential for arbitrary application of the death
penalty.65 However, during the same time that the states were adopting
the aggravating factors framework, the Supreme Court decided a
number of cases that held the new statutory frameworks were
unconstitutional because they did not allow for juries to hear
mitigating evidence which could potentially bring the sentence down
to life without parole.66 Thus, the California Supreme Court struck
down the new framework, and the legislature had to start again.67
The statute was yet again revised, this time allowing juries to hear
evidence which would support a life in prison sentence instead of a
death sentence, and only allowed a death sentence to be considered if

61. Id. at 891.
62. Proposition 17 (1972) added Section 27 to Article I of the California Constitution. CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 27.
63. Id.
64. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1000.
65. Id.
66. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 333–34 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 303–04 (1976).
67. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1000.
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“special circumstances” were present.68 These special circumstances
included murder for financial gain, murder of a police officer or
witness in a trial, and murder in the commission of rape, lewd acts
with a child, or by particularly “cruel or atrocious” means.69
a. The Bird Era
Over the next few years, with Justice Bird as the head of the
California Supreme Court, the court slowly chiseled away at Prop. 17.
Among the decisions during this period, the California Supreme Court
overturned many death sentences by allegedly ignoring the harmless
error doctrine, finding almost no trial error too small to merit reversal
of a death sentence.70 Additionally, they held that the “cruel and
atrocious” circumstances standard was too vague and that a
defendant’s intent to kill or to aid in a killing was required.71 The
tendency towards reversal in death sentence cases during the Bird
Court caused much public discontent among capital punishment
supporters, which at the time was the majority of the California
population. In 1986, voters refused to reelect Justices Bird, Grodin,
and Reynoso, three of the most liberal and anti-death penalty justices
on the California Supreme Court at the time.72 For the first time in
California history, three spots were open on the California Supreme
Court in one election.73
b. The Lucas Era
The governor at the time of these vacancies, George Deukmejian,
was a conservative and a proponent of the death penalty.74 The three
vacancies on the California Supreme Court gave him the opportunity
to nominate more conservative justices who would carry out his prodeath penalty agenda.75 While the death penalty was touted as the
primary reason for removing the three liberal justices from the
68. People v. Davis, 633 P.2d 186, 193–95 (Cal. 1981).
69. John W. Poulos, The Lucas Court and Capital Punishment: The Original Understanding
of the Special Circumstances, 30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 333, 354–56, 400–02, 407 (1990).
70. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1002.
71. Carlos v. Superior Court, 672 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1983); People v. Engert, 647 P.2d 76, 78
(Cal. 1982).
72. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1003.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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California Supreme Court, there were also other political forces at
play. Four conservative political groups raised $5.6 million in the
campaign against the Bird Court.76 These groups convinced supporters
that the Bird Court had to be overthrown because it was ignoring the
will of the voters by refusing to execute anyone.77 The underlying
motive for removing the three liberal justices, however, was likely to
obtain a conservative majority on the court so that it reflected the
newly elected conservative government.78 The Bird Court was often
accused of being anti-business, which is likely why large oil and
insurance companies contributed substantial donations to the
campaign against them.79
Justice Lucas was appointed as Chief to fill Bird’s position, and
over the years, the California Supreme Court completely reversed its
tendency towards reversal on death-penalty sentences. Harmless error
often precluded reversals, and the intent to kill requirement recently
instated by the Bird Court was reversed.80
For a period, in the aftermath of the Bird Court, it seemed as
though the opinions of both the public and the California Supreme
Court were finally aligned.81 However, it was not until 1992 that the
first person was executed in California after the enactment of the 1977
laws.82 Since then, only nine others have been executed,83 despite the
fact that 740 prisoners remain on death row.84 Since the end of the
Bird Court, California’s death penalty statutes have largely remained
the same, aside from the addition of death penalty sentences for
accomplices who played a major role in the murder and the elimination
of the gas chamber in favor of the lethal injection.85

76. Id.
77. Tom Wicker, In the Nation; A Naked Power Grab, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 1986),
http://www.nytimes.com/1986/09/14/opinion/in-the-nation-a-naked-power-grab.html; Patrick K.
Brown, The Rise and Fall of Rose Bird: A Career Killed by the Death Penalty, CAL. SUP. CT. HIST.
SOC’Y (2007), https://www.cschs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/CSCHS_2007-Brown.pdf.
78. See Wicker, supra note 77; Brown, supra note 77.
79. Wicker, supra note 77.
80. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1004.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1005.
83. Id. at 1006.
84. Death-Row Prisoners by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Apr. 1, 2018),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year.
85. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 1006–08.
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This flip-flopping over the constitutionality of the death penalty
reflects a conflict between the legislature, the judiciary, and the
California voters. Recent litigation over Prop. 66 is no different.
Briggs v. Brown, the recent litigation over the constitutionality of
“mandatory” five-year period to adjudicate appeals in Prop. 66,86 is
reminiscent of the same dance that has been going on between the
California Supreme Court and the state legislature since the 1960s.
III. PROP 66 WILL LOWER QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTED
COUNSEL AND IN TURN RAISE SIXTH AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT
VIOLATIONS
Prop. 66’s provision on appointed counsel will likely have no
effect in speeding up executions and may also cause a severe
degradation in the quality of death penalty representation. Threatening
attorneys who are on California’s various appointment lists to take on
death penalty cases will inevitably result in the appointment of
unqualified attorneys and an increased likelihood of violating the
objectively reasonable standard for effective representation required
under the Sixth Amendment.87 In turn, as there is already a national
problem with the quality of defense attorneys in death penalty cases,88
Prop. 66 will also potentially increase the arbitrary nature with which
death sentences are handed down and create a new Furman-like
violation of the Eighth Amendment.89
A. There Is No Indication of a Group of Capital Appeal Qualified
Attorneys Who Are Simultaneously on the Appointment List and Not
Taking on Death Penalty Cases
There is serious doubt that Prop. 66’s attorney appointment
provision will have a meaningful effect if the legislature leaves it as
is. To reiterate, Prop. 66 requires that the California “Supreme Court
shall require attorneys who are qualified for appointment to the most
serious non-capital appeals and who meet the qualifications for capital

86. Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29 (Cal. 2017).
87. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688–92 (1984).
88. Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard
of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 323, 324–25 (1993).
89. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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appeals to accept appointment in capital cases as a condition for
remaining on the court’s appointment list.”90
This provision assumes that there is a universe of attorneys in
California that are qualified for capital appeals yet refuse to take these
cases on. The qualifications require that attorneys have done “at least
15 hours of capital case defense training approved for Minimum
Continuing Legal Education credit by the State Bar of California”
within two years before appointment.91 It defies logic to assume that
there are large numbers of attorneys in California taking specialized
capital defense training every two years, and who are meeting all the
other qualifications under California Rules of Court, rule 4.117, yet
refuse to take on capital appeals. Approved capital defense training is
not a requirement for any other type of court appointment,92 therefore
it would be irrational to assume that attorneys would be participating
in specialized training for a type of case that they were going to refuse
to take in the end.
If the group of attorneys hypothesized by Prop. 66 does not exist
in any meaningful number, the attorney appointment provision of
Prop. 66 will fail to have any significant impact on its goal of speeding
up executions. This is an example of how Prop. 66 was crafted without
a full understanding of the details and realities of the modern legal
field. If the attorney appointment provision of Prop. 66 proves to be
ineffective and the mandatory five-year period has already been
discredited,93 there is little hope left that the remaining provisions will
make a meaningful impact on the speed of executions.
B. California Will Likely Be Forced to Lower Capital Appeal
Qualifications in Order to Effectuate the Goals of Prop. 66
As it is unlikely that there will be many lawyers who are
legitimately qualified for capital appeals and have not already taken
on death penalty cases, the legislature is bound to explicitly or
implicitly lower the qualifications for appointed defense counsel
because of the pressure to effectuate the purpose of Prop. 66.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016) (emphasis added).
CAL. R. CT. 4.117.
See CAL. R. CT. 8.300.
Briggs v. Brown, 400 P.3d 29, 59 (Cal. 2017).
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1. Explicitly Lowering Capital Appeal Qualifications
Faced with the responsibility of effectuating the will of the voters
under Prop. 66, the courts and the legislature may do this by lowering
the qualifications for court appointed counsel under California Rules
of Court, rule 4.117.94 Doing this would expand the number of
attorneys who could qualify to represent death row inmates, but, at the
same time, it would open a floodgate of ineffective assistance of
counsel claims.
The American Bar Association’s Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, which
sought to establish a national standard of qualifications for capital
attorneys, stressed that:
[t]he language [of the guidelines] has been amended to call
for “high quality legal representation” to emphasize that,
because of the extraordinary complexity and demands of
capital cases, a significantly greater degree of skill and
experience on the part of defense counsel is required than in
a noncapital case.
....
[D]eath penalty cases have become so specialized that
defense counsel have duties and functions definably different
from those of counsel in ordinary criminal cases.95
While courts are not required to use the ABA guidelines as
“inexorable commands with which all capital defense counsel ‘must
fully comply,’”96 the guidelines provide clear evidence of the
prevailing expectations and norms of defense counsel after the
guidance of cases regarding the effective assistance of counsel
standard under the Sixth Amendment left much to be desired.97 These
guidelines outline some of the unique issues that death penalty
attorneys must grapple with. It is difficult to imagine that these issues
will be handled well by attorneys who historically have avoided

94. CAL. R. CT. 4.117.
95. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003), reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 921, 923 (2003) (emphasis
added).
96. Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 8 (2009).
97. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
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handling death penalty cases, or attorneys who only meet the
potentially lower qualifications for death penalty attorneys.
Thus, when the legislature and the California Supreme Court
realize that there is still a lack of qualified attorneys under the current
statutory standards, there will be pressure from the population to do
something in order to bridge this gap. It is likely that this will come in
the form of new, lower standards for death penalty defense counsel.
In contemplating whether it wants to chip away at the minimum
standards of qualification and performance for death penalty defense
attorneys, California should consider that lower qualifications are
directly correlated with below average performance in death penalty
cases and be informed by the cautionary lessons which have emerged
from the aptly named “Death Belt.” The Death Belt is comprised of
nine southeastern states that account for 90% of executions in the
United States.98 Unsurprisingly, these states have historically had
some of the lowest qualifications for death penalty defense counsel
and have had some of the most shocking accounts of ineffective
assistance of counsel during death penalty cases.99 A recent study
showed that attorneys in the Death Belt who represented death row
inmates were disciplined and/or disbarred by the ABA three to fortysix more times than average attorneys for those states.100
Additionally, out of the 164 people who have been found innocent
and exonerated before execution on death row, only five came from
California.101 Seventy-nine have come from the Death Belt, meaning,
on average, states in the Death Belt were almost twice as likely to
sentence an innocent person to death when compared to California.102
This shows that the measures taken to ensure accurate verdicts in
California, more so than other states, have been successful so far and
are vital in continuing this accuracy. The United States, and the Death
Belt in particular, has seen the cost that comes with shortcutting these
98. The nine states that comprise the Death Belt are Texas, Louisiana, Florida, Georgia,
Virginia, Alabama, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Carolina. Peter Wagner, NYC Film:
Fighting for Life in the Death-Belt, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 3, 2006),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2006/10/03/deathbelt.
99. The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1923, 1924–25 (1994).
100. Id. at 1925.
101. The Innocence List, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocencelist-those-freed-death-row (last updated Apr. 19, 2018).
102. See id.
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measures. The lives of 164 innocent people were almost ended due to
a failure on the part of the justice system, and if California follows in
the footsteps of less meticulous states, it could be accountable for more
of these failures.103
Interestingly, several states in the Death Belt have a system
similar to what Prop. 66 proposes.104 Those who are on the
appointment list are required to take court appointments of death
penalty cases.105 The result is often passive, substandard
representation.106 This shows that while the Death Belt is more
successful at carrying out timely executions, it comes at a dangerous
price. This is a reality that California should not take lightly and may
have to confront if it starts to regress on its standards concerning the
death penalty system.
2. Implicitly Lowering Capital Appeal Qualifications
Even if the legislature does not explicitly change the
qualifications for the death penalty, courts may begin to use their
discretion to allow more leeway on the discretionary provisions of
requirements for capital appeal attorneys. California Rules of Court,
rule 4.117 does provide a few objective requirements, such as the ten
years of criminal experience, five serious or violent felony trials, and
mandatory capital defense training within the last two years.107
However, the rest of the requirements are highly subjective. For
instance, the rule provides that attorneys must “[b]e familiar with the
practices and procedures of the California criminal courts[,] . . . [b]e
familiar with and experienced in the use of expert witnesses and
evidence, including psychiatric and forensic evidence[,] . . . and . . .
[h]ave demonstrated the necessary proficiency, diligence, and quality
of representation appropriate to capital cases.”108
With the demand of Prop. 66, courts are likely to feel pressured
to be more lax about what constitutes the “necessary proficiency,

103. Id.
104. Telephone Interview with Jack Earley, Certified Criminal Law Specialist, Am. Bar Ass’n,
Co-Chair, Cal. Attorneys for Criminal Justice, President, Orange Cty. Criminal Def. Bar Ass’n
(Feb. 1, 2018).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. CAL. R. CT. 4.117(d).
108. Id.
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diligence, and quality of representation appropriate to capital
cases.”109 After all, how can courts accurately predict whether
attorneys possess these qualifications if the attorneys have previously
refused to work on capital cases? This runs the risk of allowing the
California standards for attorneys to slide towards a much lower level.
3. Constitutional Violations as a Result of Lower Qualifications
for Death Penalty Defense Counsel
If California lowers its standards and qualifications for death
penalty defense counsel, the system will become prone to
constitutional violations. The present status of the death penalty
scheme already generates countless constitutional appeals; reducing
the expectations for counsel will only exacerbate this problem by
creating numerous violations of the Sixth Amendment effective
assistance of counsel clause.110 The potentially lower skill level that
may be tolerated as a result of Prop. 66 will increase the arbitrary
nature with which death sentences are administered, thus violating the
Eighth Amendment in a manner that is reminiscent of the problems
during the Furman Era.
a. Violations of the Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution gives
criminal defendants facing capital punishment the right to an
attorney.111 This was later expanded to include criminal defendants
who faced any felony charge.112 The meaning of the Sixth Amendment
then came to include the right to effective assistance of counsel.113 This
standard of effectiveness was determined by the seminal case,
Strickland v. Washington,114 which set a high threshold.115 Under this
standard, the attorney must have acted as an objectively reasonable
attorney would.116 However, Strickland did not stop there. Even if the
attorney did not act objectively reasonably, the defendant must also

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 66 (1932).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
McMann, 397 U.S. at 771.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
Id. at 688.
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show that the attorney’s mistakes caused him undue prejudice and
denied him a fair trial.117
The standard has been criticized for sanctioning too much
discretion in ineffective assistance of counsel cases, especially in
death penalty cases, where almost any small mistake should be
construed as prejudicial.118 Additionally, it is easy to imagine how
difficult it is for defendants to prove that outcomes would have been
different had the attorneys acted differently or how they were
specifically prejudiced. Many times, whether a mistake was
prejudicial is up to the subjective opinion of the judge.119
Before launching into the repercussions of inexperienced and
unwilling attorneys taking on death penalty cases, it is important to
highlight why specialized and experienced lawyers are crucial for
effective assistance in these cases and just how uniquely challenging
capital appeals are. Aside from the emotional burden of having a
human life on the line, death penalty cases present novel and complex
processes and issues. It has been understood by experienced defense
attorneys, scholars, and the United States Supreme Court that “death
is different.”120 The exceptional complexities and difficulties of
capital cases have caused some to deem it “perhaps the most
technically difficult form of litigation known to the American legal
system.”121 Not only is there the arduous emotional and moral toll of
being the only thing that stands between a defendant and a lethal
injection, but the unique issues that arise, as well as the massive

117. Id. at 687.
118. Amy R. Murphy, The Constitutional Failure of the Strickland Standard in Capital Cases
Under the Eighth Amendment, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 179 (2000).
119. Id. at 180.
120. HUGO ADAM BEDAU, DEATH IS DIFFERENT: STUDIES IN MORALITY, LAW, AND POLITICS
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987); see also Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (noting that
“death is different in kind from any other punishment imposed under our system of criminal
justice”).
121. The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, supra note
99, at 1925; see also ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel
in Death Penalty Cases, supra note 95, at 923 (“More than seventy years later, death penalty cases
have become so specialized that defense counsel have duties and functions definably different from
those of counsel in ordinary criminal cases.”); Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 317 (1983) (“[B]ecause of
both the special procedures . . . and the uniqueness of death as a punishment, defense counsel has
additional responsibilities in capital cases that are unlike those of counsel in all other criminal
trials.”).
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investigative efforts that are necessary, are unprecedented by any other
type of criminal case.122
The most distinctive and important difference in death penalty
cases is the bifurcation of the trial: one trial to determine guilt and
another to determine whether the death penalty should be
implemented, often called the penalty phase.123 To provide a strong
case for mitigation to life without parole at the penalty phase, the
defense attorney must step into the role of an investigator to uncover
any and all circumstances in the defendant’s history which may
convince the jury to spare him or her.124 Counsel may present evidence
of abuse as a child, abuse by the victim, or by any other outside force
which may help explain the crimes committed.125 Particular hardships
or traumatic circumstances in the defendant’s life may be used to
humanize the defendant.126 The defense usually hires a “mitigation
specialist” who the defense attorney may use in private or elicit
testimony from on the stand.127 Additionally, specialists are essential
to investigate mental health issues if there is a possibility of an insanity
defense.128
The ability to present mitigating evidence has proved to be
absolutely crucial for many defendants.129 The importance of
mitigating evidence was recognized by the ABA in its Supplementary
Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in Death
Penalty Cases.130 These guidelines enumerated the duties of defense
attorneys and the comprehensive scale at which defense attorneys
must investigate their client’s life story.131 While Prop. 66 focuses on
the appointment of counsel on subsequent appeals rather than trial
counsel,132 it is equally necessary that the appellate counsel
understands the unique penalty phase so that they can investigate
122. Goodpaster, supra note 121, at 317.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 317–18.
125. See id. at 319–20, n.106.
126. Id.
127. ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, supra note 95, at 959–60 (explaining the importance of mitigation specialists).
128. See ABA Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense Teams in
Death Penalty Cases, reprinted in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 677 (2008).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 680–81.
132. See Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016).
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whether a potential mistake was made during the trial. This often
creates a complex mixture of factual and legal disputes. A less
experienced attorney who has never examined a bifurcated death
penalty trial may not detect important issues and nuances that could
make a compelling case.
Due to the unique and specialized set of skills required to provide
effective assistance of counsel in a death penalty case, Prop. 66
increases the prospect of Sixth Amendment violations. Ineffective
assistance of counsel claims are amongst the most common claims on
appeal following death sentences and are already a major cause of
delay.133 If the prevalence of these appeals is already high with the
present standards of defense counsel qualifications, it only seems to
follow logically that they will proliferate when Prop. 66 forces courts
to lower expectations and inexperienced, unwilling attorneys begin to
take on death penalty cases.
Consequently, the increased likelihood of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims will only further bog down the system and prolong
the time it takes to reach an execution. To solve the lack of quality,
qualified counsel, California must fund defense counsel properly—not
attempt to lower important standards that protect inmates’
constitutional rights. Although Prop. 66 has attempted to alleviate the
lack of willing and qualified attorneys, it seems as though there is a
great risk that this attempt may backfire. While Prop. 66 will likely
encourage qualification standards to drop, the standards that the Sixth
Amendment sets for effective assistance of counsel will not. This
mismatch will plague the death penalty system in California with
further constitutional violations.
b. Violations of the Eighth Amendment
Lowering the qualifications for death penalty attorneys and
forcing unwilling and inexperienced attorneys who are seemingly
“qualified” under California Rules of Court, rule 4.117 will not only
increasingly violate the Sixth Amendment, but also increase the
arbitrary nature of death sentences in violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of “cruel and
unusual punishments.”134 While this is a broad phrase, the United
133. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 125.
134. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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States Supreme Court has stated that the standard of what qualifies as
cruel and unusual punishment evolves as the “public opinion becomes
enlightened by humane justice.”135 This stands for the principle that
the scope of what is cruel and unusual punishment develops with the
evolution of modern, public standards of morality.136 In Furman, the
arbitrary imposition of death sentences was deemed to fall within the
modern scope of what was cruel and unusual, but was then rectified
by Gregg.137 Under Prop. 66, however, California’s death sentence
system will likely fall within that scope again.
For years, members of the legal community have argued that “[i]t
is not the facts of the crime, but the quality of legal representation, that
distinguishes [cases], where the death penalty was imposed, from
many similar cases, where it was not.”138 The “cruel and unusual
punishment” clause of the Eighth Amendment was largely the cause
of the Supreme Court’s de facto moratorium in the 1970s.139 The
decision in Furman highlighted the fact that the death penalty was
being applied in an unacceptably arbitrary and discriminatory fashion.
While the concerns in Furman were seemingly quelled by requiring a
mandatory scheme of aggravating factors to reinstate death penalty
statutes, lowering the qualifications for death penalty defense
attorneys runs the risk of restoring the arbitrariness of the death
penalty, depending upon which attorney the defendant happens to
get.140
This problem is not new. Many have recognized that the
difference between life and death for many defendants comes down to
the lawyer they get. Even Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg
acknowledges that seemingly the sole factor determining the
application of the death penalty is the quality of defense attorneys:
“People who are well represented at trial do not get the death
penalty . . . . I have yet to see a death case among the dozens coming

135. Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
344, 378 (1910)).
136. Id.
137. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 225 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 281
(1972) (Brennan, J. concurring).
138. Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but
for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1836 (1994).
139. Culver & Boyens, supra note 38, at 991–92.
140. Furman, 408 U.S. at 281; Bright, supra note 138, at 1837.
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to the Supreme Court on eve-of-execution stay applications in which
the defendant was well represented at trial.”141
Of course, it could be argued that this is the case for any
conviction—if you have a good lawyer you get off, if you have a bad
lawyer you don’t. However, there is an unusually strong connection
between the abilities of death penalty attorneys and the imposition of
capital sentences.142 This is likely because of the unique nature of the
penalty phase, and the specialized set of skills attorneys require to
provide an effective defense. Once a defendant is found guilty and
eligible for the death penalty, the penalty phase can be very fickle.143
It often comes down to how well the attorney can humanize or muster
mercy and sympathy for the defendant.144 Whereas, in a non-capital
case, attorneys are much more likely to run into familiar issues and
root their arguments in objective elements of a crime, once a statutory
special circumstance is met, the penalty phase is largely up to the
discretion of the jury.145
The sole determining factor of whether a defendant is sentenced
to execution should not be his attorney, just as the Supreme Court
determined it should not be the color of his skin in Furman.146
However, the correlation between adequate representation and the
imposition of death sentences is a reality that California must grapple
with and provide safeguards for. Given the strong correlation between
poor defense attorneys and death sentences,147 it is imperative that
California maintains a strong standard of qualifications for these
attorneys. Lowering the qualifications or forcing inexperienced
attorneys to take on these appeals will potentially reinstate the
concerns in Furman. Allowing the pool of attorneys eligible for
appointment to include a wide swath of skill makes it so that the
defendant’s fate is up to the luck of the draw. If they get a good
141. Statements on the Death Penalty by Supreme Court Justices, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/statements-death-penalty-supreme-court-justices#ginsburg (last
visited Oct. 8, 2018).
142. See The Eighth Amendment and Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Trials, supra
note 99, at 1928.
143. See Goodpaster, supra note 121, at 334–39 (discussing the intricacies of the penalty
phase).
144. Id. at 335.
145. Id.
146. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972).
147. Bright, supra note 138, at 1836.
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attorney, his or her life will likely be spared. If, however, he or she
gets a new attorney, who has begrudgingly accepted a death penalty
defense case so that they can remain on the appointment list, they may
have much lower hope of surviving.
The risk of Eighth Amendment violations is not only concerning
from a due process standpoint, but also from a practical one. If inmates
have the opportunity to file more constitutional appeals, the system
will continue to get clogged with an unmanageable amount of appeals.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Meaningful reform must take place to solve the problems with the
current death penalty system. California must invest additional money
into creating a workable and constitutional death penalty system.
Reforms may include increasing the pay and resources for capital
appeal appointed defense counsel and creating a judicial body that is
solely tasked with adjudicating death penalty cases.
A. Altering the Pay Scheme for Capital Defense Attorneys
and Increasing Defense Resources
Although it was not crafted properly, Prop. 66 was indeed onto
something by attempting to increase the number of attorneys who
would take on capital cases in order to speed up executions.148 Waiting
for the court to find and appoint appropriate counsel is one of the main
causes of delay in capital cases.149 Inmates may sit on death row for
over five years before counsel is appointed.150 The answer, however,
does not lie in forcing a nonexistent group of attorneys to
begrudgingly take on capital cases for pittance. Instead, California
should seek to increase the number of qualified attorneys by funding
defense efforts properly and making capital defense work more
attractive.
Practitioners agree that death penalty defense is often
underfunded.151 Effective attorneys who devote the necessary amount
of hours to their case often submit a bill to the court for their
compensation, but are only reimbursed for a fraction of the actual
148.
149.
150.
151.

See Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016).
Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 7, at S47.
Id.
See id.
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hours they put in.152 It becomes clear, then, why the majority of
lawyers who agree to take on death penalty cases must be passionate
and invested in the cause.
Many capital defense attorneys are adamant abolitionists who are
passionate about the cause and are willing to take on death penalty
cases even though they know they may not be compensated
properly.153 While this is commendable, there are simply not enough
attorneys willing to take on the emotional burden, and financial
setback, of a capital case out of political or moral convictions alone. If
California were to alter the pay scheme for appointed death penalty
attorneys and provide a substantial amount of additional resources,
more defense attorneys may be willing to take on the cases. This again
highlights the point that attorneys who only take death penalty cases
as a result of Prop. 66’s threat to take them off the appointment list
will likely not be willing to put in the number of hours required to
provide effective assistance, as they know that they will only be
compensated for a fraction of those hours.
The California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice
suggested a number of reforms to make a workable death penalty.154
In order to “address the unavailability of qualified, competent
attorneys” the Commission recommended that California: (1) expand
the Office of the State Public Defender; (2) expand the Habeas Corpus
Resource Center; (3) increase the staff of the Offices of the Attorney
General; and (4) increase funding made available to the California
Supreme Court.155 Additionally, the Commission recommended that
funds be allocated to counties so that they can fully reimburse
payments to counsel for defense services, that the current limitations
on funding for the expense of homicide trials be reconsidered, and
that:
California counties provide adequate funding for the
appointment for the performance of trial counsel in death
penalty cases . . . . In all cases, attorneys must be fully
compensated at rates that are commensurate with the
provision of high quality legal representation and reflect the
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at S97.
Telephone Interview with Jack Earley, supra note 104.
CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 116–17.
Id.
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extraordinary
responsibilities
in
death
penalty
representation.156
Prop. 66 implemented none of these recommendations.157 With
current funding, attorneys are faced with choosing to put in adequate
time and be undercompensated, or only putting in the amount of time
they think they will be compensated for, which will likely not be
enough to effectively defend their client.158 The Commission
estimated that implementing its recommendations would increase the
annual cost of the death penalty from $137 million to $232.7
million.159 A starting point may also be to raise the pay of state
attorneys to the $175 hourly rate that federal capital appeal counsel
receives.160 Currently, state counsel usually bid for a flat rate that often
only covers a fraction of the funds necessary to properly defend their
death penalty cases.161 This will cost taxpayers at least $85 million per
year alone.162 Voters may be angered and shocked when confronted
with realistic numbers of what it would take to fix the system,
especially when initiatives such as Prop. 66 have overpromised results
without additional funding.
An additional way to guarantee sufficient funds would be to
implement a principle of equitable defense in death penalty cases.
There is a large disparity between the amount of resources that are
allotted to prosecutors versus indigent defense counsel.163 Part of this
disparity likely comes from the fact that the people’s right to state
funded prosecution of criminals in California has been present in
society since the state was founded.164 Public defense, however, was
much more of an uphill battle. The right to assistance of counsel for
indigent defendants was not recognized in death penalty cases until

156. Id. at 117.
157. See Gen. Elec. (Cal. Nov. 8, 2016).
158. See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 116–17.
159. Id. at 117.
160. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 7, at S214–15.
161. See id. at S80–81.
162. Id. at S215.
163. See CTY. OF L.A., COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 2017–18 FINAL ADOPTED BUDGET,
http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/lac/1037208_2017-18FinalAdoptedBudgetCharts.pdf (allocating
2,216 positions to the District Attorney and only 1,159 to the Public Defender).
164. Office History, L.A. CTY. DIST. ATTY’S OFFICE, http://da.co.la.ca.us/about/history (last
visited Oct. 13, 2018).
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1932165 and was not incorporated to the states until 1963.166 Still, since
then, the public budget seems to always prioritize prosecution over
defense.167 The author proposes that when the death penalty is on the
table, prosecution and defense should be provided with equal
resources. If California is willing to execute someone, it should also
be willing to invest an equal amount into his or her defense. It will
come down to whether California wants to invest the degree of
resources required to carry out the death penalty in a constitutional
manner.
B. Creating a Separate Death Penalty Court
Another practical solution would be to create a specialized death
penalty court. This would ensure that there is a judicial body that is
solely held accountable for the state of the death penalty system.
Additionally, the judges and staff of this court would be uniquely
accustomed to death penalty issues, so that they could more efficiently
adjudicate the matters.
Although this option is a massive change and would require a
great deal of legislation, a subject-specific court is not inconceivable.
Other areas with unique issues and ramifications have merited their
own court. At the federal level there is the Federal Circuit that deals
exclusively with patent suits, the United States Bankruptcy Courts,
United States Tax Courts, United States Courts of International Trade,
United States Court of Appeals for Veteran Claims, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.168 In various states
there are specialized drug courts, dependency courts, domestic
violence courts, juvenile courts, truancy courts, mental health courts,
probate courts, and the list goes on.169 Something as important as life
or death should also fall into the category of meriting its own court if
the death penalty is to continue.

165.
166.
167.
168.

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963).
See CTY. OF L.A., supra note 163.
MARKUS, B. ZIMMER, INT’L JOURNAL FOR COURT ADMIN., OVERVIEW OF SPECIALIZED
COURTS 8–11 (Aug. 2009), http://www.iaca.ws/files/LWB-SpecializedCourts.pdf.
169. Specialized
Courts,
NAT’L
INST.
OF
JUSTICE,
https://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/pages/specialized-courts.aspx (Mar. 13, 2013).
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V. JUSTIFICATION AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
FOR PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Additional resources and funding will allow death penalty cases
to be heard and adjudicated more quickly while preserving a
constitutional system. The vast investment this system would require,
however, may not be worth the tenuous societal benefits that the death
penalty offers.
A. A Practical and Constitutional Death Penalty System
Is Not Possible Without Additional Funding
The only tenable solution to significantly and sustainably
improve the death penalty system would require a sizeable investment
of taxpayer dollars.170 If the legislature were to increase pay for death
penalty attorneys and/or create a separate court for death penalty
cases, the public may see an increase in efficiency. Whether this is an
advisable use of public funds should be left up to the voters by
generating a realistic funding proposal to accompany Prop. 66.
The unfortunate and unsatisfying truth is that, with the current
budget, what the California public desires is impossible. The only
thing that could potentially make a real change to the death penalty
system is pouring millions of additional resources into it. Going on as
we have is not a sustainable option. The mistake California has made
is in thinking that Prop. 66 will indeed fix its problems for free.
Without more resources, there are two options: a system that executes
inmates quicker while compromising accuracy and heightening the
potential of killing innocent people or, what we already have, a system
that takes an unreasonable amount of time to execute inmates but seeks
to preserve accuracy by utilizing all possible precautionary methods
and appeals. Prop. 66 is a poorly devised shortcut solution because
voters and politicians have yet to accept that a real solution under the
current budget is untenable.
B. Public Policy Considerations
While additional funding would help effectuate the goals of Prop.
66, there are considerations as to whether the allocation of additional
funding would substantially benefit the public interest. The dollar
170. See CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 117.
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amount that it would take to maintain an efficient and constitutional
death penalty system continues to grow while the rationale for
sustaining the death penalty dwindles. The dollar amount it would take
to properly fund an efficient death penalty system takes away from
funds that may be needed and better used elsewhere.
1. Deterring Attorneys from Remaining on the Appointment List
Fears have been expressed that instead of increasing the number
of attorneys to work on death penalty cases, Prop. 66 may provide a
disincentive for attorneys to stay on the appointment list altogether.171
Not only would this defeat the goal of Prop. 66, but it would also have
a negative impact on the criminal indigent defense programs in
California as a whole. Additionally, there is also a risk that the
pressure to eliminate the backlog on death row may bring the
California courts to a standstill in terms of adjudicating other civil and
criminal matters. This, in itself, may foster violations of other parties’
rights to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.172
2. Would the Potential Investment Be Worth It?
It seems impractical to invest billions173 of taxpayer dollars to
maintain a form of punishment that is disfavored by nearly half of the
population of California and does not provide substantially more
benefits than life without parole.
As far as practicality, life without parole takes criminals off the
street so that they are no longer a threat, and a life left to languish in
prison is a harsh punishment fit for atrocious crimes that would
otherwise merit capital sentences. There is little evidence that death
sentences have a significant deterrent effect on crime.174 In fact, there
have been mixed reports as to whether the families of the victims even
benefit from the purported sense of closure that executing the inmate
is supposed to impart.175 Many victims’ families report feeling a sense
of guilt afterwards.176
171. Donohue, supra note 10.
172. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
173. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 7, at S65.
174. See Kirkpatrick v. Chappell, 872 F.3d 1047, 1063–64, nn.4–5 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that
death sentences alone, without an execution, do little to deter crime).
175. See id. at 1064.
176. Id.
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Over the past forty years, California has spent $4 billion on a
death penalty that has executed just thirteen inmates.177 That $4 billion
could have been used toward a more proven method in reducing crime:
employing more law enforcement.178 In this time span, California
could have employed over fifty-eight thousand more police officers
with the money used towards a completely ineffectual death
penalty.179 The additional law enforcement could have prevented
roughly seven hundred additional murders.180 A death penalty that
adopted the proper reform proposals suggested above would cost
$232.7 million per year, whereas a system that eliminated the death
penalty in favor of life without parole would cost $11.5 million
annually.181 Figures such as this make it difficult justify pouring vast
amounts of additional funding into death penalty efforts.
Perhaps the state should focus on redirecting that money into
social programs that benefit low-income and minority families, as
these are the demographics that are disparately represented on death
row. A shift toward preventing the surroundings that have been proven
to foster the development of violent criminals, rather than
implementing the harshest punishment possible once the crimes
happen, could benefit society to a greater degree. The money could be
used for afterschool programs to give children in impoverished areas
an alternative to joining gangs, in the foster system to create a healthier
environment for children with no family, or in social services so that
the incredible caseload for social workers could be alleviated so they
would be able to devote more attention to individual cases. The list
could go on, but it seems logical to recognize that there are other areas
that could benefit and ultimately better serve society with billions of
dollars in public resources.
As tempting as it is to label the inmates on death row as monsters,
there is some truth in the tenet that “[m]ost criminals are not born, they
are made.”182 While it may not be that black and white, there is value
in recognizing that at least part of the evolution of a violent criminal
177. Alarcón & Mitchell, supra note 7, at S111; Wagstaff, supra note 5.
178. See Donohue, supra note 10.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 147.
182. MRS. FREMONT OLDER, WILLIAM RANDOLPH HEARST, AMERICAN 450 (D. AppletonCentury Co. 1936).
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is a reflection of their societal conditions. Many inmates become
violent as a result of years of abuse and violence at home, through
traumatic events, or in response to emotional and physical cruelty.183
A large portion of people in prison were abused as children,
brought up in reprehensible circumstances, and endured an amount of
suffering that no one would envy before turning to crime and
violence.184 The correlation between childhood abuse and violent
crime is astounding; a child that is neglected and abused is at least
three times more likely to engage in violent crime.185 Clearly,
repealing the death penalty would not put an end to violent crime as
we know it. It would, however, be a step in the right direction toward
refocusing our budget and our attention toward preventing the type of
environment where these crimes flourish rather than spending billions
of dollars on an unfeasible and draconian form of punishment once
they have happened.
Nevertheless, if this is what California voters want, they are
democratically entitled to it. However, voters need a realistic plan of
how to fix the death penalty system, not another ballot initiative with
empty promises.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the voters of California, the decision seems easy. Someone
who commits an unspeakable, atrocious crime no longer deserves to
live. However, for the judiciary and those in charge of managing the
death penalty system, the decisions along the way cause great inner
turmoil. The voters want a death penalty, but when faced with the
practical constraints of a legal system susceptible to human error, the
court second-guesses itself. The voters want to make the people who
committed these atrocities pay, but then the judges who hear the
appeals waver when confronted with the uncertainties of a factsensitive, emotion-laden jury trial. The voters want to fulfill a gritty
sense of retribution, to send out a deterring message that in California
you pay for what you have done. But then, the court takes a nervous
183. See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIOR ABUSE REPORTED BY
INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 3 (1999), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/parip.pdf.
184. Id. at 2–3.
185. Diane J. English et al., Childhood Victimization and Delinquency, Adult Criminality, and
Violent Criminal Behavior: A Replication and Extension, Final Report, NAT’L INST. OF
JUSTICE 33–34 (Feb. 1, 2002), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/192291.pdf.
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step back when it sees how easily a trial can veer in one direction or
the other based on a skilled cross-examination, an inexperienced
witness, or a nuanced legal fine point.
The erratic history of the death penalty, the halt it has come to,
and the recent attempts of Prop. 66 to fix it only reveal the deep-seeded
truth that while the voters of California may say that they want a death
penalty, the law cannot come to terms with its fatal pitfalls. While they
so badly want the satisfaction of reprisal, and of closure for the
victims’ families, the judiciary’s conscience is dragged down by those
lingering questions: What if the defense attorney had ordered a mental
health evaluation? What if he had called that witness? What if he had
introduced that fact? Can any error be “harmless” when someone’s life
is on the line? Perhaps this is why California is where it is today, stuck
in a fog of obscure legal battles and naive reform propositions.
Because as much as voters say they want a death penalty, the court is
always stopped by the inevitable and communal pit in its stomach; that
is, if there was a mistake made along the way, the ability to rectify it
perishes along with the inmate.
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